CAMEO Landmine Clearance

The authors wish to thank the many people and organizations who have contributed to this Study, and in particular the Chairman and the Executive Director of Operation Save Innocent Lives-Sudan (OSIL-S) who set the parameters for the Study, the New Sudan Council of Churches which provided not only advice but also practical assistance during the visit, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), Danish Church Aid (DCA), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), UNICEF Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Delegation in the Sudan, Médecins-sans-Frontières (Swiss), Aktion Afrika Hilfe e.V., and Mrs. Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior representing the Widows, Orphans, and Disabled Rehabilitation Association of the New Sudan (WODRANS). The authors also wish to thank the the Royal Netherlands Embassy and the Canadian High Commission for their encouragement in the furtherance of this vital project on behalf of OSIL-S.

The authors are also most appreciative of the participation of the United Church of Canada, the Anglican Church of Canada, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, the Mennonite Church and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) Humanity Fund, without whose financial assistance this Study would not been able to have been accomplished. The authors would particularly like to recognize Lee Holland of the General Council of the United Church of Canada, under whose leadership this mission was developed and funded.

The views expressed in this Study are those of the authors, and are in no way to be construed as having been accepted or considered by Operation Save Innocent Lives-Sudan (OSIL-S) towards any particular strategy or plan for the strengthening of the New Sudan's indigenous capacity for emergency relief from, and eventual elimination of, the land mine and unexploded ordnance hazard in southern Sudan. That some or all of the recommendations made herein might eventually be incorporated by OSIL-S into its policies and plans is entirely the decision of OSIL-S and not that of the authors.

3.1.1 Since the British withdrawal from the then-Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1955, internal conflict has been continuous in the Sudan, with the exception of the decade ending in 1983 when then-President Al-Nimeiry permitted a measure of self-government to the southern region of Sudan. After 1983, the fighting intensified not only because of the cancellation of the accord but also because the Government of Sudan considerably increased pressure on the south, including attempts to "Arabize" and "Islamize" it through terror tactics as well as open combat. Land mines have been laid in southern Sudan ever since the first civil war began in 1955, but it is only in the last 15 years that widespread indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines has been the norm. Villages and settlements have been paralysed by this use as well as the GOS policy of air raids on villages using cluster bombs, and millions of people have taken flight.

3.1.2 The casualties of this war are primarily civilians, and the United Nations has estimated that 1.3 million Sudanese have died since this second war began in 1983. The UN also estimates that four million Sudanese have become internally displaced, and hundreds of thousands more have taken flight to neighbouring countries where they suffer in refugee camps.² An example of this latter suffering is the refugee situation in Uganda, where the Lord's Resistance Army, backed by the Government of Sudan, has slaughtered many Sudanese to the point where many have determined that it is safer to return to Sudan and chance being blown up by a mine than it is to remain in so-called refuge in Uganda. (The GOS was the only country at a recent UN Meeting which voted against the motion to censure the LRA over its use of children as soldiers). This "forgotten war" is also particularly vicious, with recorded UN evidence of the most serious human rights violations by the GOS, some of which are extrajudicial killings and summary executions, slavery, kidnapping of children, and torture.

3.1.3 The land mine and UXO/UXB crisis in the New Sudan which has resulted primarily from the indiscriminate use of mines and cluster bombs by the GOS has been exacerbated by the lack of infrastructure in southern Sudan as well as by a lack of community cohesion. When an individual has been maimed by a mine, he or she usually dies because effective casualty evacuation is all but impossible due to the poor condition of the roads (also mined) and the lack of medical facilities in the New Sudan which are capable of sustaining massive trauma injuries. The crisis is both acute and all-pervasive, and results in over 10 casualties per day in southern Sudan. The UN has estimated the number of mines in the Sudan to be between 500,000 and 2 million, which although germane to the situation, would have been better measured in land and communities abandoned due to the mine hazard threat, because even rumours of mines let alone hundreds of them in any area usually results in those areas being abandoned. What was the nation's breadbasket has now been effectively eliminated, which is made even more catastrophic by the famine in Bahr el Ghazal Province to the north of Equatoria.

3.1.4 The United Nations' Department of Humanitarian Affairs was asked by the GOS on 25 January 1997 for assistance in dealing with its landmine problem. The DHA Mission was conducted from 11 to 23 July 1997, effectively only a net ten days to study both northern and southern Sudan (the largest country in Africa). This resulted in an Assessment Report which of necessity was much more theoretical than practical and which arrived at conclusions many of which appeared to be personally instinctive rather than logically deductive because they did not

result from a process of deductive logic based on actual trip observations or discussions.

3.1.4.1 Consequently, when the Assessment Team recommended that a Mine Action Centre not be formed for southern Sudan, they erred tragically in their logic. A MAC is just what is required to come to grips in an orderly fashion with the mine and UXO problem in an area of armed struggle within its sea of changing circumstances and conflicting requirements, as was the case in Cambodia and Angola when a MAC was set up there whilst a war was in progress. Moreover, the Central Mine Action Office (CMAO) in Angola negotiated the Mine Action Section of the Lusaka Peace Accords which ended the war, and a MAC could well do the same for the New Sudan. Not to have a MAC is to "penny-packet" out resources, thereby creating inefficient use of these scarce items and failing to grasp the overall problem and treat it as an entity, resulting in decisions being made from the narrowest base of knowledge rather than the broadest. Without a MAC, a mine survey is at best "catch as catch can" and can not enable proper demining priorities to be set within a matrix of priority of needs for the New Sudan as a whole.

3.1.4.2 The humanitarian benefits to be achieved from the implementation of a full mine action and victim assistance programme in the New Sudan far outweigh the potential negatives from such action, as has been the experience in virtually every MAC set up by the United Nations. Southern Sudan is no different. The sooner the MAC is formed and funded the sooner a comprehensive and cost-effective Mine Action Plan for the whole southern region can be established, with the concomitant saving of innocent lives on an exponentially-graduated scale.

3.2.1 The situation in southern Sudan does not lend itself to a previous "made in Cambodia" or "made in Angola" strategy, except for the basic organization of the MAC. The UN is not the agency forming the MAC, but rather OSIL-S, and the MAC will not operate over the complete Sudan but rather only the southern region at this time (in this latter point it is like the UN's Central Mine Action Office in Angola which originally only included the Angolan Government-held territory). Because the New Sudan has by far the highest incidence of mines in the Sudan, the MAC will be able to readily add the northern region to its mission should that opportunity arrive in future.

3.2.2 Since OSIL-S has been given the mandate by the SPLM Government in the New Sudan for all humanitarian mine action and victim assistance in the regions under its jurisdiction, the MAC formed by OSIL-S should begin its operations in these areas, extending them to other jurisdictions when the appropriate agreements have been negotiated and put in place. Once the other areas of the New Sudan have witnessed the effectiveness (and the neutrality) of the new MAC, whose mission is purely humanitarian and in no way connects to any conflict, it is expected that invitations to assist these areas will be forthcoming.

3.2.3 The framework of the MAC should include Sudanese management at the various levels, advised by expatriate experts until the indigenous capacity to manage has been attained. To achieve this should take about five years, with the logistics, finance, and administrative roles being the most difficult to implement under existing conditions in the New Sudan. This staffing concept is the reverse of the UN MAC's, whereby UN experts manage the MAC initially and have an understudy until the understudy has achieved sufficient experience to take over the reins himself (or herself). Dual signing authority would be maintained at all levels,

to ensure donor confidence in the expenditure of funds until the appropriate Sudanese capacity level has been achieved. All NGOs, indigenous and expatriate, operating in the New Sudan whose work includes assistance to the MAC would have that work coordinated by the MAC, rather than run a mine action programme separate and distinct from the MAC. By so doing, duplication and overlap will be obviated. A "made in Sudan" MAC organization and establishment concept paper has been circulated separately by CAMEO for comment, and will later be included (as modified) as Annex C to this Report.

3.2.4 Given the almost total lack of infrastructure in the New Sudan, as well as the very low literacy levels, establishing an effective victim assistance network will present a special challenge. For example, literacy education is required for the workers who constitute the existing community health care structure (primarily women) because of the need to conduct mine awareness education as an integral part of their health care responsibilities. Also, particular reliance must be placed on stabilizing a victim near the accident site if lives are to be saved because evacuation to a medical treatment facility will continue to have to be primarily by land which incurs time and bodily agitation during travel. Proper stabilization requires effective first aid and the use of trauma kits, which also means more training for community health care workers.

3.3.1 The three principal options available to OSIL-S to implement a mine action and victim assistance programme in the New Sudan are:

Option 3 - create a Mine Action Centre in the New Sudan and direct existing and future resources into this operational framework.

3.3.2 Although the cost for Option 3 is the highest, it provides for a controlled expansion and returns the greater value-for-money in the long term and contains the least risk factor overall. Also, of the three options it provides for the most positive control, which is essential in a sector experiencing continuing conflict. It is, however, the most difficult of the three organizations to control by one person (Executive Director OSIL-S). The proposed organization of the NSMAC is shown at Annex C to this Report.

- There is an urgent and vital need for a complete mine action and victim assistance programme to be implemented in southern Sudan, for which the preferred organization to most effectively coordinate this programme on behalf of the GNS is a Mine Action Centre formed by OSIL-S;

- There is a broad base of support for OSIL-S in its mission to coordinate and control all aspects of mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan, ranging from the de facto government formed by SPLM through supporting NGOs such as CAMEO, NSCC and DCA and UNICEF/OLS to the international donor community;

- There is an absolute requirement for a formal infrastructure to be added to OSIL-S to enable it to become self-sustaining and not be solely

- There are sufficient pacific areas within Equatoria for OSIL-S to be fully occupied for the first three years of a five-year programme, with other provinces of southern Sudan being added as the pacification process proceeds and the MAC gradually increases its capacity;

- The mission of the MAC for the duration of this initial five-year programme should be to establish all the necessary community networks and to conduct emergency relief aspects of a full mine action and victim assistance programme, including returnee re-settlement and a thorough mined area verification of the New Sudan. The follow-on programme's mission would be more oriented towards the sustainable development aspects of mine action and victim assistance such as opening up resource areas and rehabilitating victims and war-psychologically-impaired communities as a whole, as well as a detailed application of mine and UXB clearance in accordance with reconstruction and redevelopment priorities; and

- Donors can have complete confidence that with OSIL-S in the MAC form of organization their investment in the mine action and victim assistance activities of the New Sudan will bring about the highest return of both immediate and sustainable benefits to this war-torn society.

3.4.2.1 Programme design and development should be accomplished through a Committee composed of members of OSIL-S' Board of Directors, the Executive Director and his key expatriate advisors, and representatives of the donor community. The Chair of this Committee should be the Chairman of the Board of Directors or an alternate Board Member if the Chairman can not be present. Resolutions passed by this Committee could then be expected to be supported by the appropriate donations required to put them into place, and activities planning can be done within a medium of certainty of implementation. Semi-annual donor update meetings could be held with all donor countries and agencies to allow them to track the progress of their investment. Such "transparent" accounting for the use of donor funds could be the key to obtaining substantial support from secular governments in addition to the already committed Church organizations who identify more instinctively with OSIL-S' mission in the New Sudan.

3.4.2.2 An expatriate assistance matrix of NGOs and other agencies supplying advisory personnel to OSIL-S should be created to clarify and coordinate all the many forms of assistance to be utilized by OSIL-S in the carrying out of its mandate, particularly on the mine awareness and victim assistance portion of the mission. There are many expatriate and indigenous NGOs supplying medical, social, and other services within Equatoria, where OSIL-S' mandate will initially be exercised, and to avoid duplication and overlap, each one of these assistance agencies should be recognized for their mission work to date and asked to fit the OSIL-S requirements into their responsibilities for their target populations as

much as they possibly can. To do this, OSIL-S will have to finalize its areas of interest for the first year of its operation and to plan its gradual increase in the scope of its operations around the capacities already existing in the OLS/NGO community. In its follow-on mission to OSIL-S as soon as the funding can be put in place, CAMEO will assist the Executive Director OSIL-S in the formulation of this mission analysis, but it is recommended that in the meantime the OSIL-S Board of Directors start gathering this information from the OLS/NGO

3.4.2.3 Creating the New Sudan Mine Action Centre is a natural follow-on from the matrix management being recommended to OSIL-S to avoid duplication and overlap in its programming. The NSMAC is a self-sustaining form of organization to ensure that all parts of the mine action and victim assistance programme for the New Sudan can be effectively coordinated within one overall mission statement and one Mine Action Plan for the New Sudan. In effect, should OSIL-S adopt this form of organization, it is recommended that they become known as the NSMAC because of its air of permanence for the region and its inherent visibility as a supra-NGO coordinating authority for humanitarian mine action and victim assistance on behalf of the Government of the New Sudan. It is most sincerely hoped that the United Nations will recognize this MAC as being similar to the MAC they would have formed themselves should they have decided to do so, and enable the NSMAC to utilize funds from the UN Mine Action Voluntary Trust Fund for the vital and urgent humanitarian mine action work in the New Sudan. By so doing, the UN would become actively involved in quality assurance and thereby increase donor confidence in the effective and efficient utilization of these trust funds by the NSMAC.

4.1 Background to the current crisis. The current internal war in southern Sudan is an almost exact reflection of the writing of St. James in his epistle general: "What causes wars, and what causes fighting among you? Is it not your passions that are at war in your members? You desire, and do not have; so you kill. And you covet and cannot obtain; so you fight and wage war."⁽¹⁾ For the past 14 years since then-President Al-Nimeiry cancelled his accord with the southern region of Sudan wherein he had permitted a measure of self-government, the internal war has continued unabated despite efforts to secure a negotiated peace. The casualties of this war are primarily civilians, and the United Nations has estimated that 1.3 million Sudanese have died since this second war began in 1983 (the first began in 1955 when the British withdrew from the then-Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and ended in 1972 when then-President Nimeiry created the accord with the south). The UN also estimates that four million Sudanese have become internally displaced, and hundreds of thousands more have taken flight to neighbouring countries where they suffer in refugee camps.⁽²⁾ This "forgotten war" is also particularly vicious, with recorded evidence in the same UN Report of the most serious human rights violations by the GOS, some of which are extrajudicial killings and summmary executions, slavery, and torture.

4.1.1 The National Islamic Front (NIF) currently forms the Government of Sudan (GOS), and their primary objective is to have all of the Sudan governed by the Sharia, a fundamentalist code of Islamic law. To do so, the GOS has a policy of "Islamization" and "Arabization" of the Sudanese population, whether Muslim, Christian or of traditional African religions, to attain this "pure" goal. Because this objective is religiously based, human rights are cast aside in favour of this "higher", and non-negotiable, principle. Furthermore, any oppressive measures believed by the GOS to be required to fulfil this "higher" calling are employed, in the same manner as the historic Inquisition in Spain. There can be no peace until this "vision" has been permanently blinded, and because it must be assumed that a war with such religious overtones could carry on indefinitely, southern Sudan must now move forward to establish as much normalcy as it possibly can in the areas which are no longer subject to military ground incursions. This normalization includes greatly increasing the capacity of OSIL-S to coordinate and control all aspects of land mine/UXO action and victim assistance in the New Sudan, despite the continuance of the war.⁽³⁾

4.2 The land mine and UXO/UXB crisis in the New Sudan is tied directly to the GOS' mission as mentioned in paragraph 4.1.1 above. The GOS' indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilian population centres and their equally indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines have created a greatly exacerbated toll of loss of life and limb on innocent victims, primarily women and children, and have created a refugee and IDP situation of crisis proportions. Moreover, there is great pressure for refugees and IDP to return to their traditional areas regardless of the mine/UXO status there because of the increasing persecution and suffering these Sudanese have been experiencing in these camps and supposed shelters. For example, in northern Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), supported by the GOS, has been terrorizing Sudanese refugees' settlements there, to the point where many refugees are given "Hobson's choice" - stay in the camp and face possible death by violence, or return to their homeland and face possible death by mines and UXO. The establishment of a MAC in southern Sudan and an expanded demining workforce would alleviate the peril found in returning to their traditional lands, and there is a high degree of urgency to this requirement. Casualties from mines and UXO currently occur at a rate of at least ten per day, peaking well over that figure whenever the GOS conducts aerial bombing runs on civilian population centres, and that figure will greatly increase in proportion to the number of returning refugees and IDP.

4.2.1 The August 1997 UNDHA Mine Situation Assessment⁽⁴⁾ is a flawed document. Although much of this document describes conditions fairly accurately, conclusions drawn from this evidence make it difficult to determine how the authors got from "A" to "B" in their deductive processes. Much of the document appears to be more theoretical than practical, with what would appear to be foregone conclusions, most of which could have been written straight from an office without benefit of a reconnaissance on the ground. As an example, given the evidence of deaths, maimings and disfigurements described in the Report, it is highly difficult to see why it would not be in the best interests of the southern Sudanese to form a MAC to get on with the life-saving mission even while the war was still on. For example, the Central Mine Action Office (CMAO) in Angola negotiated the Mine Action Section of the Lusaka Peace Accords which ended the war, and a MAC could well do the same for the New Sudan. Not to have a MAC is to "penny-packet" out resources, thereby creating inefficient use of these scarce items and failing to grasp the overall problem and treat it as an entity, resulting in decisions being made from the narrowest base of knowledge rather than the broadest. Without a MAC, a mine survey can not set proper priorities within a matrix of priority of needs for the New Sudan as a whole. Furthermore, if as is reported on page 6 of this document that "Both the GOS and the SPLM/A would like mine action to start with the support of the United Nations as soon as possible.", why should a Level 2 mine survey of southern Sudan only "...be undertaken as soon as a cease fire or peace agreement is signed"?

4.2.1.1 Another unfortunate flaw in this document is the statement in paragraph 5.2 on page 18: "In the opinion of this mission, the security situation in Sudan is not stable enough to justify any type of mine clearance operations until a comprehensive political settlement is achieved, and conflict ceases." Would the same mission be of the opinion that it is not justified to vaccinate

Sudanese children "until conflict ceases"? Yet mines are as much a scourge as polio, cholera, or yellow fever, and anything which can be done to "inoculate" a settlement from mines (such as mine survey and demining) must be done. To do otherwise is to deny the humanitarian imperative. What OSIL-S proposes is to conduct mine survey and clearance in areas which are no longer subject to military incursion, so that resettlement of agricultural lands can occur and those towns which have been splattered with UXB can be made safe to live and work in. In CAMEO's opinion, this proposal is not only sound from a donor value-for-money viewpoint but is also an absolutely vital initiative with which to begin the peacebuilding process.

4.2.1.2 There is evidence in this UN document that the authors may have had a separate agenda in mind when writing it. The statement at the bottom of page 18 is particularly germane: "Given the expense, and capital intensive nature of mine clearance operations, even emergency clearance operations to restore access to towns, water points, etc. would be at this point inadvisable. Experience has shown how easy it is in a conflict environment for malefactors to remine areas cleared at great expense....This degree of uncertainty makes it inadvisable to commit personnel, capital, and equipment to mine clearance operations at the present time." If such is indeed the logic of the UN, why did they begin their operations in Cambodia and Angola when they did? Why did they form MACs in both Bosnia/Herzegovina and Croatia when they did? Surely there must be another answer to this conundrum, and it is suspected that it is this - the then-DHA feared the risk of failure if they attempted one MAC for all of Sudan at this time, or that if they supported a MAC only for the New Sudan the UN would be seen in a partisan light by the GOS who would then block other UN initiatives in southern Sudan such as those UNICEF/OLS is undertaking (mercy flights, etc.). The document's conclusions do not naturally follow from the factors presented nor germane factors to the contrary which were not presented.

4.2.1.2.1 This suspicion is further supported by the UNDHA Mission's comments on page 19 of their Report: "The provision of mine detectors and training in finding and marking mine fields is an activity that has potential military as well as humanitarian benefits. Proper monitoring to ensure that such equipment and trained personnel are not used for military purposes would be impossible under the present conditions in Sudan. One could almost guarantee that they would, in fact, be used for military operations. Thus, it is recommended that this activity (survey and marking) be delayed until a cease-fire has been declared." How long will one wait for a cease-fire in a war which has a theological basis as well as ethnic? One has only to study the crusades for that answer! Moreover, instead of doing nothing just because mine detectors and mine action training can be a double-edged sword, why not instead recommend that systems be put in place to ensure such an action can not occur? For example, since the SPLA have renounced the use of mines, have an SPLA representative in the MAC who will spot those trainees who might use their training for the benefit of those who would perpetuate the war and then release the suspected trainees. It is most ironic that while the UN had its Protective Force in the former Yugoslavia, it ordered its Canadian sappers to remove mines rather than to detonate them in place, and to hand the removed mines over to the local authority - ignoring the fact that the local authority would just re-lay them somewhere else! Why, then, is the UN so concerned that the provision of mine detectors and training in the New Sudan might get out of hand? Donors can have every confidence that their provision of mine detectors and their funds spent on training will be as well used as ever they have been in any other country suffering problems similar to southern Sudan.

4.2.1.3 There are sufficiently more examples in this Report of conclusions not matching the factors presented that it must be concluded that this document is fundamentally flawed. Potential donors supporting OSIL-S and its mission should judge this Report accordingly. The need for mine survey and clearance is now, beginning with the pacified areas for the many returnees. Donors are vitally needed now to help OSIL-S save the innocent lives that are reflected in their title. OSIL-S has asked The Canadian Association for Mine and Explosive Ordnance (CAMEO) Security to assist them in their setting up of an appropriate MAC for the New Sudan, because it will give the best value for donors' money in mine action and victim assistance in both the short and long terms. Such was the case with Angola, and such will be the case with New Sudan.

4.3 Corrective action taken to date by OSIL-S is found in their document "Mine Awareness and Demining in the New Sudan"⁽⁵⁾. OSIL-S currently has one demining team of five former SPLA sappers, and one team of five former SPLA sappers conducting mine awareness education in the New Sudan. As stated in this document, "OSIL-S is approaching the problems of mines as an integrated and combined action of awareness and clearance." Acknowledging the reluctance of donors to fund local organizations, OSIL-S is proposing a partnership with donors "which specifically obligates each other contractually for civilian mine action and locations specifically for civilian humanitarian purposes." Basic mine surveys have been conducted in a number of communities with the help of a British demining NGO, The HALO Trust, but funds have not been forthcoming to carry out mine clearance activities in these areas except for a three-month stint by HALO where they concentrated primarily on removing UXO in Yei town and surrounding areas. The HALO Trust has indicated that it will not be able to return to southern Sudan for the foreseeable future.

4.3.1 A formal mine survey has not yet been able to be carried out because of a lack of manpower and equipment. Because of the few resources currently available to OSIL-S, their ten deminers must concentrate on reacting to urgent calls rather than implementing a systematic clearance plan based on priorities developed from a comprehensive mine survey. Some mine location information is obtained by the mine awareness team, however, and is passed to the clearance team for action.

4.4 The OSIL-S Initiative as reflected in the document "Mine Awareness and Demining in the New Sudan"⁽⁶⁾has as its Implementation Plan for 1997/98 to recruit and train 30 people, of whom 10 would conduct mine awareness and 20 would undertake mine clearance. This ambitious programme is hampered by the lack of equipment, for which OSIL-S has requested donors to provide either in funds or in kind up to a value of US$458,100. The state of donations at the time of writing this Report is not known, but it is suspected that some slippage will have to occur in project implementation. Although the churches in various countries and communities have been generous in their donations, projects of this

magnitude require other major sources of funding as well. Assuming from the UN Report that the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action will not be made available, it is incumbent upon other institutional or governmental donors to provide the balance of funds to achieve this highly desirable objective. OSIL-S considers this plan for 1997/98 to be the first year of a continuing mine action programme whereby OSIL-S will be able to eventually coordinate all aspects of mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan in areas which are not subject to military disruption.

5. The purpose of the CAMEO Mission was to investigate ways and means of strengthening OSIL-S' capacity to conduct mine action and victim assistance operations in the New Sudan and to make recommendations to OSIL-S accordingly. The methodology of the CAMEO Mission was to consist of interviewing all applicable people, NGOs and donors and visiting the areas of New Sudan which were listed for action in the OSIL-S document "Mine Awareness and Demining in the New Sudan". Unfortunately, a visit on the ground in the New Sudan was not possible due to a lack of transport, so this Report will not be able to comment on existing facilities, equipment and personnel in the New Sudan itself but rather will make recommendations of a more general nature. The names of organizations, agencies, and personnel consulted are listed at Annex A to this Report.

5.1 CAMEO's Chief of Public Health and Victim Assistance, Ms. Barbara Holt RN, conducted separate enquiries concerning capacities and necessities for mine awareness, casualty evacuation, and victim assistance and rehabilitation. Her research went well beyond that originally intended because of information gained from persons whom she consulted, and she concluded that much more than the usual public health and victim assistance "package" would be needed by OSIL-S for effective project implementation. The Executive Director OSIL-S approved the expanded nature of her study as it complemented the original OSIL-S Pilot Project Proposal.

5.2 CAMEO's Chief of Technical Services, Mr. Roger Gumbrill, attempted to proceed to the New Sudan via Uganda, but was halted at Arua, Uganda, for lack of transport.

6.1 Choosing a "made in New Sudan" strategy was deemed to be the most appropriate means of proceeding with the investigation. To attempt to compare the situation in the New Sudan with other countries' organizations and efforts in mine action and victim assistance was considered inappropriate because the New Sudan is unique in many aspects which have no parallel in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosnia or other mine-affected country except Angola.

6.1.1 The underlying ethos in all mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan is that OSIL-S must be, and must be seen to be, the final authority in all matters related to these operations. It is not satisfactory, for example, for an expatriate demining NGO to run a programme separate and distinct from that operated by OSIL-S, even if that NGO were to be completely funded by its own national government. The SPLM has deputized OSIL-S to coordinate and control all mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan on its behalf, effectively declaring OSIL-S to be the equivalent of a MAC for southern Sudan. This MAC then becomes the focal point for all mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan, which enables the most effective use of funds and a more positive control over demining activities by NGOs and/or private companies. Training and operations can then be standardized, and deminers working for various NGOs and

other agencies will be more able to be shifted around the country to where the urgencies exist, and will have a country-wide common pay scale. OSIL-S will act as the hiring authority for all Sudanese deminers, and will be responsible for ensuring that these deminers do not use their new skills for other than humanitarian purposes, thereby calming any donor fears of misuse of training.

6.1.2 The effect of the ongoing internal war can be reduced to a minimum by selecting areas for mine action only from those priority sites which are not subject to military incursion. Removing CBU will be subject to fluctuation, however, because the GOS can bomb areas which have recently been cleared. There is no real escape from this fact, except for the international community to keep the pressure on the GOS to cease from using this totally indiscriminate method of conflict. The SPLA have declared that all mines removed will be destroyed and not re-used in the war, and this promise should be taken at face value until proven otherwise, as it marks a measurable beginning to the reduction of mines threatening the civilian population in the New Sudan. In any case, as long as the SPLA remains on the offensive rather than the defensive, there will be little

reason for them to lay mines. The GOS has signed the Treaty to Ban Anti-personnel Mines, although they have yet to ratify it, so it may be assumed that any further minelaying by the GOS should be the exception rather than the rule despite their being forced back on the defensive. Factions within the New Sudan who are on the offensive against each other will have to be made to understand that the military utility of mines is far outweighed by the humanitarian reality. Whereas in Mozambique Operation Ploughshares gives seeds and tools to those who turn in weapons, OSIL-S could consider giving seeds and tools to those internal factions who bring in their mines to be destroyed.

6.1.2.1 The fact that most mines in southern Sudan according to OSIL-S' estimate have been laid within three km on either side of roads and tracks because the nature of the war was more one of control of movement than denial of arable areas such as has been experienced in Mozambique and Angola, helps OSIL-S to better coordinate mine survey and clearance operations. On the other hand, it has been reported that cluster bombing has occurred primarily around population centres, and therefore EOD operations may have to undertaken separately from demining until the primary UXB sites have been decontaminated. In the case of Juba, should that city be attacked by the SPLA, extreme refugee problems will result as inhabitants flee the fighting, and safe passage areas will have to be opened in the perimeter minefields on a high priority basis or else a disproportionate number of casualties will result.

6.1.2.2 The current struggles between factions in the south may destabilize mine action and victim assistance endeavours in affected areas. Consequently, this factor must be given weight in any plans to remove mines and UXB from those areas in order to not experience a re-mining situation. At the same time, however, mine awareness activities in these areas should continue unabated.

6.1.3 The lack of infrastructure in the New Sudan will impede the initial establishment of sufficient communications, both electronic and physical, to coordinate and control a sophisticated network of mine action and victim assistance activities throughout southern Sudan. Currently, OSIL-S has its HQ in Yei, consisting of one permanent building and three tukuls, and security of the site is compromised because of the lack of fencing. At the same time as OSIL-S expands to assume the duties and responsibilities of a Mine Action Centre, therefore, donors will be asked to fund infrastructure projects to permit the level of infrastructure to keep pace with the increase of mine action and victim assistance activities. Satellite sites will also be needed in principal

clearance sectors such as Kajo Keji and Lui when this expansion takes place, because of the lack of good all-weather roads and the total lack of air supply support available to OSIL-S as long as the GOS controls civil aviation.

6.1.3.1 Casualty evacuation and victim assistance (see para 6.2.7 below) is a particular challenge, given the lack of infrastructure, the parlous state of most roads and tracks, and the lack of air evacuation capacity. Consequently, much attention must be paid to the empowerment of village community health workers to stabilize casualties until evacuation can be arranged. This lack of initial casualty sustainment results in injuries which otherwise could be treated becoming fatal. OSIL-S will have to give equal priority to establishing an effective casualty evacuation and victim assistance system to fulfil their mandate of saving innocent lives.

6.1.4 The current health structure and victim assistance capacity is not only limited by infrastructure, however. Availability of trauma kits and first aid supplies, states of training of existing community health care personnel, low literacy levels, the gender differential, and community cohesion all present their own challenges.

6.1.4.1 The current health structure. Within southern Sudan there are between 260 to 300 Primary Health Care Units, with each unit serving a catchment area of approximately 5000 people. There are two distinct levels - the Primary Health Care Unit and the Primary Health Care Centre. The difference between the two levels lies not in the size of the facility but in the number of staff and their qualifications. A PHC Unit would have a Traditional Birth Attendant (TBA) and a Community Health Worker (CHW), whereas the PHC Centre typically has a Medical Assistant (MA), a Nurse, and a Laboratory Assistant (LA) in addition to one CHW and one TBA. In Western Equatoria there are District Hospitals at Maridi and Tambura, and in Eastern Equatoria there is a District Hospital in Yei (operated by NPA). The district hospital in Torit currently has its staff and equipment relocated in three smaller sites as a result of continuing conflict in that area. There are rural hospitals (one ward and an outpatient department) in Lui and Kajo Keji in Eastern Equatoria. All hospitals performing surgery must have HIV/AIDS testing capabilities and in the event of transfusions the blood donations come from the patient's family members, both requirements for which are key to successful recovery from mine/UXO-initiated massive trauma.

6.1.4.2 The capabilities of the health care personnel in southern Sudan vary considerably, but overall there is limited knowledge and low capacity. Prior to the war, there was training for registered nurses and certified nurses, with the registered nurses being trained in the main hospitals serving Sudan's larger cities, and the certified nurses being trained in smaller rural facilities. The training of the former was good, whereas in the latter case it was of a much lower standard. The majority of the health staff currently working as Mas have come from the base of former certified nurses, and the lower quality of training and the years of not practising have created this low capacity. Some expatriate NGOs are training health workers (AAH is one example), and approximately 300 CHW have been trained over the last four years and are scattered across southern Sudan in their respective communities. Many CHW have already been absorbed into the expatriate NGOs as local staff. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) is actively involved in establishing training standards for the 35 NGOs participating in the UNICEF/OLS consortium, with UNICEF coordinating but not directing these NGOs. All NGOs are working within the structure of the local communities, with the degree of community involvement ranging from minimal to active participation such as planning and decision-making. It can be concluded that the organization for

an effective casualty evacuation and victim assistance system is in place as far as treatment is concerned, and what is needed is an upgrading of staff standards and adequate medical supplies and equipment.

6.1.4.3 Low literacy standards, particularly women's literacy because they form the basis of the community health care network, need to be raised to the point at least where instructions in the massive trauma kits and in first aid manuals can be easily understood, for example. Similarly, the empowerment of rural women is essential to providing them the capacity to establish a business base to each PHC so that it can be weaned from outside support in the fullness of time. The NSCC and its member churches are aware of the gender issues affecting the women of southern Sudan, and encouraged by the SRRA they are conducting leadership training to strengthen and empower women. Similarly, international NGOs such as OXFAM and indigenous NGOs are participating with the NSCC and SRRA in this challenge.

6.1.4.4 Community cohesion is essential to a successful victim assistance and rehabilitation programme. The psychological trauma of land mine injuries multiplies the initial shock resulting from loss of a limb, sight, or hearing. In developing countries such as the New Sudan, victims must come to terms with the reality that they are most likely to become a burden on their family and community. Persons who have suffered disabling war wounds as well as widows (who

also may be amputees) are similar to the landmine victim - they struggle to provide for their families and to regain a place in society. Many former soldiers in these countries turn to crime to sustain themselves. Communities need to learn to accept the disabled, widows, and orphans as worthwhile members of the community if the disabled are to be effectively rehabilitated. At the same time, the disabled and disadvantaged need to be trained in a skill or a trade which will lead them to self-sufficiency so they can cease being a burden on their community and be better accepted thereby. Indigenous NGOs such as WODRANS are the best choice for creating this community cohesion and victim rehabilitation, because the solutions must come from within the communities and cannot be imposed on them from without. OSIL-S needs to include community cohesion in its victim rehabilitation coordination role.

6.1.4.4.1 Part of this community cohesion is adversely affected by a lack of psychological assistance available to the community as a whole to overcome an underlying community feeling of helplessness or inactivity borne of a feeling of uselessness in the face of continuing conflict. Many communities in southern Sudan which have been relentlessly cluster-bombed, for example, and which have deserted their habitations and are dispersed in the outback, need to have both a psychological as well as a sociological healing in order to return to productive lives in their villages. OSIL-S will need specialists in this area, and although it appears to be a long-term requirement only, the need for resettlement of villages is essential now as a part of the overall mine action and victim assistance network.

6.1.5 The economic factor is an all-pervading one which underlies all attempts at creating a national capacity for any endeavour, let alone mine action and victim assistance which can be very expensive. Mine action and victim assistance are not only required for humanitarian situations but also for economic renewal circumstances, such as the re-opening of resource sectors such as agriculture or mining. Because the "bottom line" for economic renewal is profitability, any programmes designed to strengthen the economic sector need to have a stable political climate and an uninterrupted process schedule. The latter requirement may include the need for mine survey and clearance of sites, not the least of

which is the assurance to technical workers, particularly expatriate, that their work at the site will not be subject to landmine accidents. OSIL-S will need to provide the necessary assurance to the resource sector, and that is done by conducting quality assurance inspections of all demining work done on site by either indigenous or foreign NGOs. QA is also needed for humanitarian projects, particularly if the NGO carrying out the demining does not enjoy the full confidence of the local population. The psychological stigma tied to landmines is so great that if only one mine is suspected to be in a field one hectare in size or on a track five km long, no one will go into that field or down that track regardless of the low probability of becoming a mine casualty.

6.1.5.1 After OSIL-S has fully established the New Sudan Mine Action Centre, it will become the focal point for all demining in the New Sudan, whether humanitarian or economic. Some international corporations operating in mined countries in the past have hired local talent and given them only minimal mine training because of the cost factor. To ensure that Sudanese deminers are not placed in danger due to the extreme pressure upon them to earn hard currency which coerces them to agree to a hiring regardless of safety standards, all corporations should obtain their deminers from a fully-trained labour pool held by the NSMAC, which will then be able to regulate wages and working conditions for deminers working in the resource sector.

6.2.1 The relationship of OLS with the New Sudan and OSIL-S is a key factor in the success of OSIL-S' establishing a MAC for the New Sudan and coordinating all mine action and victim assistance for the Government in the New Sudan. OSIL-S is not a part of the UNICEF/OLS consortium, but rather is separate because its mandate could not be accommodated if it were part of the OLS consortium. OLS is a three-pronged "neutral" coordination organization consisting of representation with the GOS, the GNS, and the NGO community working in both parts of Sudan.⁽⁷⁾ Although OLS is limited in its partisan intervention capability on behalf of the New Sudan because UN/OLS agreements formally recognize GOS ultimate authority over all the Sudan (it must receive approval from the GOS before it can send mercy flights into southern Sudan, for example), with tacit approval of the GOS it coordinates many humanitarian NGOs in southern Sudan which are essential to OSIL-S fulfilling its mine victim assistance and rehabilitation mandate from the GNS. Since OSIL-S intends to give special emphasis to this latter function by establishing empowerment programmes in the communities in which deminers and EOD technicians are working, OLS' contacts with the NGOs specializing in these areas are vital to OSIL-S' achievement of its objectives in these areas. OLS also maintains a substantial logistics capacity which will be of great use to OSIL-S as it expands gradually into the MAC for the New Sudan. Since OSIL-S is a purely humanitarian organization with a Board of Directors separate and distinct from the GNS, it could be expected that the GOS will permit OLS to assist OSIL-S in its mission despite the fact that mine survey and clearance are military-sensitive operations, because it was the GOS which asked the UN in January 1997 for help in creating a humanitarian mine action programme in all of the Sudan.

6.2.2 The mandate of OSIL-S vis-à-vis that of expatriate NGOs in mine action and victim assistance presents a conundrum which will have to be solved if real progress is to be made in expanding OSIL-S gradually to become an effective MAC for all of southern Sudan. Whereas OSIL-S has the SPLM mandate not only to coordinate but also control all mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan where the SPLM holds sway, expatriate demining NGOs are accustomed to being responsible to their donors for the effective use of the donated funds and within that parameter as cooperative and flexible as possible with the national coordinating authority in the host country. OSIL-S is recommending that: "...all funds for the project be managed and controlled from a separate account under a joint signature system - Director OSIL-S and outside financial specialist."⁽⁸⁾

6.2.2.1 This latter direction can pose OSIL-S - NGO relationship problems. Should the MAC order an expatriate NGO to operate in a certain area or to conduct a specific programme, such direction may come in conflict with the NGO's donors and could result in a withdrawal of funding to the NGO or even the relocation of the NGO to another country to implement its donors' priorities. Moreover, donor funding of demining NGOs historically has been direct to the NGO and not through the MAC, because the project scope originates from the demining NGO. Where the MAC receives direct funding and puts out a request for proposal, however, the normal relationship of contract-holder to contracted NGO would apply, as happens when the UN contracts out projects from its mine action trust funds. The NSCC, as a member of OSIL-S' Board of Directors, currently accounts for all donations to OSIL-S and maintains an international perspective with the donor community. It is suggested that this arrangement continue to be the case once OSIL-S forms a MAC, and that there be representation on the Board from the donor community. By so doing, OSIL-S could maintain a project fund not unlike a trust fund, where the trustees are the members of the Board, and donors could then donate to OSIL-S but earmark their donations for particular NGOs working with OSIL-S if they wish.

6.2.3 Time requirements and constraints. While OSIL-S needs to gradually increase its capacity to assume the organization and responsibilities of a MAC, it still must cope simultaneously with the urgency of conducting mine/UXO awareness and avoidance education in the most hazardous areas as well as surveying and spot-demining to make safe the areas to be utilized by returnees. Consequently, OSIL-S will require separately-funded expatriate assistance to expand its organizational capacity at the same time as its appeal for the first year funding in its Pilot Project Proposal needs urgently to be donated in full. With a casualty rate of 10 innocent victims per day killed or maimed by mines and UXB in southern Sudan, OSIL-S' capacity to reduce the immediate unspeakable suffering at the same time as it organizes to cope with the longer term must be a high priority within the donor community.

6.2.3.1 Because of the impediments to transportation and communication as a result of the topography of the New Sudan, including access to and egress from OSIL-S project sites, each site will have to be more self-sufficient than otherwise would be required, resulting in higher-than-normal stock levels of medicines, supplies, and equipment at each site. In turn, protection of these attractive items in relatively isolated areas indicates the need for OSIL-S to

interface closely with other NGOs in the locality which may have secure accommodation or to hire security personnel, not only because of the value of the goods but also because it will take that much longer to deliver replacements for any stolen or destroyed items.

6.2.4 Resources and sourcing. Up to the present, OSIL-S has acquired resources from whatever donor or agency has offered them, either in money or in kind, and has tailored their operations to the art of the possible within the limits of these resources. OSIL-S' Pilot Project Proposal which was issued on 1 October 1997 has had a slow reception to date, but outside commentary has been positive. Funds have been provided by a number of donors, and one donor (Christian Aid) has obtained equipment and supplies abroad and delivered them to OSIL-S. ICRC Kenya has provided a project vehicle, and DCA will be providing three Danish nationals to assist OSIL-S with its project management and administration. These resources have been provided without benefit of a long-term plan for OSIL-S' future expansion, because of the urgent need for mine action now. A longer-term plan would be able to identify not only the priority needs but would also include a sourcing plan to ensure a minimum of duplication in donations in kind as well as a financing plan to ensure the full and continuous use of these resources.

6.2.4.1 The SPLA have also made available some of their trained deminers to work for OSIL-S and have donated mine detectors, and such an action underscores the seriousness with which the SPLM is treating the humanitarian side of demining. However, there have been suggestions from some quarters that OSIL-S is "in the pocket" of the SPLA and that their personnel could return to the war having upgraded their skills through work with OSIL-S. To dispel such allegations and to ensure full credibility that OSIL-S is independent of the SPLA, SPLA resources provided to OSIL-S need to form part of a long-term plan to ensure these resources do not return to the SPLA for martial use later. Once this plan has been approved by both the OSIL-S Board of Directors and the donor community, it should be placed in a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the SPLM/A and OLS (and hopefully the GOS because it is a humanitarian document and

the GOS have stated to the UN that they favour humanitarian mine action). This document should be then lodged with the UN, so that any potential donor will know that any assistance or materiel provided to OSIL-S by the SPLA can not be returned to them to use in their war effort.

6.2.5 Personnel and administration currently are two functions not formally constituted in OSIL-S because of a lack of infrastructure, but rather OSIL-S is supported informally in these areas by other agencies such as NSCC and partner NGOs such as DCA. Because OSIL-S will be receiving a considerable amount of equipment and some expatriate assistance this year, there is a need to institutionalize these functions within OSIL-S' organization, and the small HQ complement in Yei (radio operator, field coordinator, field monitor, and driver) are already multi-tasked, as are the five deminers and the five mine awareness instructors. A DCA consultant will be attached to OSIL-S this year for six months to assist in the establishment of a formal administration and accounting system, but so far no donations have been received for infrastructure. Establishing a sustainable ongoing administrative capacity in OSIL-S is essential to the beginning of a five-year plan to gradually set up a MAC in the New Sudan, and donor solicitations should include this requirement. This administrative system also includes a communications element (telephone, facsimile, and radio), although it is understood that communications in Yei will take more time to establish because of the lack of municipal communications services in the New Sudan.

6.2.6 Supply and transportation are two more technical services which will have to start almost ab initio due to a lack of existing capacity. OSIL-S has recently taken delivery of a second-hand station wagon from the ICRC, but needs an ongoing project support system to promote efficient and effective use of current project resources, let alone those extra supplies and equipment scheduled for delivery this year. Although OSIL-S has only included one vehicle in their Pilot Project Proposal, a second vehicle is essential to maintain flexibility in case one vehicle breaks down or is damaged beyond local repair. The addition of a fuel monotrailer to the list of equipment shown in the OSIL-S Pilot Project Proposal should be a priority, because of the scarcity of fuel resources and outlets in the New Sudan.

6.2.6.1 Re-supply will of necessity be by land once the materials and equipment arrive in southern Sudan. CAMEO has investigated an aerial supply route through Uganda, using airheads at Entebbe and Arua, whereby land shipment need only occur between Arua and the Sudan border except for oversize equipments for which there is a flight limitation from Entebbe to Arua. An alternate to this would be to use Lokichokkio as the airhead, but travel by land from there to the secure areas of Western and Eastern Equatoria is considerably longer and adversely affected by the condition of the roads within southern Sudan.

6.2.7 Medical and casualty evacuation presents problems similar to re-supply, except that OLS might be able to obtain clearance from the GOS for mercy flights where none might be forthcoming for supply flights. Assuming mercy flights were approved, the local settlement would provide emergency first aid and take the victim to the nearest landing ground for air evacuation to Lokichokkio for treatment at the ICRC hospital there. In the more likely event that such flights were not able to be arranged in sufficient time, requiring evacuation by land, a network of medical and paramedical will be essential to victim survival en route to a location where massive trauma injuries can be effectively treated. Currently, very few victims survive unless their wounds are superficial, because massive trauma injury victims can neither be stabilized locally nor evacuated sufficiently speedily to ensure effective medical intervention leading to recovery.

6.2.7.1 First aid involves stopping the bleeding and removing the injured person from the minefield without endangering other lives, followed by evacuation to the nearest medical facility in time to prevent contamination of the wound. It is not sufficient only to know how to apply a tourniquet, however, but also to know that proper positioning of the tourniquet (neither too high nor too low) and that such tourniquets can only be on for no longer than six hours is vital to saving a limb from amputation that might not otherwise be required (or amputated higher than would otherwise be necessary). Furthermore, the administration of antibiotics soon after the accident to avoid the onset of infection is paramount. Consequently, it is not sufficient only to have trauma kits positioned locally in communities throughout a mined area, but rather local inhabitants need training on how to use these kits. Therefore, as mentioned in para 6.1.4.3 above, there will have to be literacy training given to those involved in the community health care network to ensure that the extra precautions and initial treatments necessary for successful stabilization of a victim with massive trauma injuries can be properly administered through the reading of procedures pamphlets in the trauma kits.

6.2.8 Coordination of current projects and management of the new organization and its expanding area of responsibilities require that OSIL-S expand its current base of management to include "middle management" individuals to whom the

Executive Director can delegate specific managerial responsibilities. This factor can be the most challenging in implementing mine action and victim assistance projects because it is usually more complex than actual demining or first aid to victims. Choosing appropriate persons to train in this area is in itself a challenge, because these individuals must be capable of interfacing effectively with the international agencies and organizations supporting OSIL-S. Expatriate assistance in this area will be required for the full five years of the programme to transform OSIL-S from a crisis-reaction mode into a coordinated management mode (MAC) for all mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan. Donors should be requested to support this requirement equally with the other operational needs of OSIL-S if OSIL-S is to obtain the required capacity to sustain its expanding area of responsibilities with only a small cadre of expatriate advisors once the five-year plan has been completed.

6.3.1 The underlying concept of the mine awareness and victim assistance network is for OSIL-S to tap into all available community resources to educate their client communities in mine awareness and use of trauma kits for mine victims. Expatriate and indigenous NGOs could instruct their client populations at the same time as they fulfil their primary missions. OSIL-S members would train the NGO personnel on mine awareness and provide materials to the NGO to distribute to its client population at the same time as they do their rounds of the settlements. The victim assistance part of this network also includes these NGOs, but in this case they would receive trauma kits and be trained on their use. Each community would then appoint a local coordinator of mine awareness and victim assistance who would be responsible for holding the mine awareness materials and trauma kit for that community as well as for supervising the ongoing education of the community in mine awareness and avoidance and providing initial response to mine accidents within the community.

6.3.1.1 In spite of the number of agencies focusing on primary health and secondary care, there is a gap in the area of first aid, specifically in first aid to mine victims. Moreover, following the first aid, the local community will have the vital task of transporting the wounded to a medical facility as soon as possible. OSIL-S will play a key role in transportation, because very few communities have that capacity. This fact requires OSIL-S to have effective

communications with local areas, primarily by radio, and it is preferable that each community have a radio capacity located with the supervisor of the local area network. It is recommended that the New Sudan's policy on the use of radios be revisited to permit timely notification to OSIL-S by these communities of casualties, which will enable the most effective evacuation.

6.3.1.2 Although the severe psychological trauma of mine injuries, both to the victim and to the local community in which the victim lives, is recognized, there has been virtually nothing done to furnish additional psychological assistance to the community, but rather physical rehabilitation of the victim has been the focus. Settlements have been abandoned in the face of continuing cluster-bombing, for example, and psychological help is needed to convince these communities to re-assemble rather than remain dispersed and suffer starvation and/or disease. To overcome community feelings of helplessness or hopelessness in the face of mines and UXO, each community so affected should have a study done of its needs by international health experts, who would determine what is needed in that community to provide support to persons traumatized by war. CAMEO's links with the Centre for International Health at McMaster University in Canada can be utilized by OSIL-S to provide support to those persons traumatized by war.

6.3.2 Interfacing with OLS and expatriate NGOs is essential to implementing an effective and efficient mine awareness and victim assistance system. The UNDHA Assessment Report is woefully shortsighted when it says: "...implementation of a mine awareness training programme in the former region of Equatoria will be extremely difficult because of the difficulty in travel, the high rate of illiteracy, and the lack of any social infrastructure.....To be candid, at present it is impossible to think of a mine awareness training model currently in use that will work extremely effectively in southern Sudan."⁽⁹⁾ With their air of hopelessness, such conclusions are not helpful. Sudan is not Cambodia or Bosnia, so what is needed is a "made in southern Sudan" solution, which has been previously described in para 6.3.1 above. This solution sees OSIL-S interfacing with OLS and expatriate NGOs already in the New Sudan to add mine awareness training to their other agendas. OSIL-S would work through OLS to reach the approximately 35 NGOs participating in the UNICEF/OLS consortium, and since all these NGOs work within the structure of the local communities they are therefore central to the influential members of these communities who would be the best placed to take local leadership roles in mine awareness training.

6.3.3 Interfacing with the Community Health Network is also required to ensure the best possible mine awareness and victim assistance network. These PHC workers could hold and use when necessary the trauma kits for their community, and mine awareness education could be worked into a community health teaching package just like education to avoid cholera. It is accepted that such a network could not be established overnight, but rather over the shortest period of time possible, given the numerous problems which exist in the New Sudan. The key is to begin forming this network immediately, and not to continue studying the problem ad infinitum, let alone using these large problems as a disclaimer for predetermined failure before anything has even been attempted.

6.3.4 Objectives for Yei, Kaya, and Kajo Keji sectors should be the first to be implemented, because those sectors are relatively secure. The following objectives are suggested for OSIL-S implementation as and when funds permit:

1. To establish mine/UXO awareness programmes in each project location and in the camps for the internally displaced;

2. To facilitate the establishment of functional literacy programmes, particularly for women, which relate to mine awareness and victim assistance in each project location;

3. To create a mine and mine victim data base by gathering information on mine accidents, location, extent of injuries, details regarding evacuation to medical facilities, other suspected mined areas, etc., using a proforma to be developed specifically for simplicity of reporting;

4. To develop a first aid training course with step-by-step guidelines to a level meeting the OSIL-S/UNICEF training standards, with learning outcomes designed to accommodate the art of the possible in those areas;

5. To train four medical assistants, Community Health Workers, or individuals with a similar health background in first aid to work alongside the OSIL-S demining teams to provide on-site first aid treatment if required. Candidates will be selected by their respective communities;

6. To train four medical assistants, Community Health Workers, or individuals with a similar background in first aid to provide on-site first aid treatment for their respective communities. Candidates will be selected by their respective communities;

7. To provide trauma kits (dressings, splints, tourniquets, medication (such as antibiotics, tetanus toxoid and analgesics) and intravenous infusions, administration sets, stretchers, blankets, etc., to each project location initially, and thence to other areas when more personnel have been trained to use them;

9. To collaborate with NGOs to establish a rehabilitation facility in the form of a prosthetic workshop in Yei; and

10. To facilitate training for women in specific trades (carpentry, blacksmithing, tailoring, leather and textile work, etc.) needed to set up and maintain the prosthetic workshop as well as to contribute to the development of the community infrastructure.

6.3.5 Future expansion of the network beyond the areas currently targeted in OSIL-S' Pilot Project Proposal will proceed at a measured pace, adapted to the availability of secure areas, funding, and expatriate NGO and OLS assistance, and with a view to self-sustainment by the time the MAC has been set by OSIL-S on a sustainable footing. This latter objective is subject to the peace status within the New Sudan by that time.

- It is the easiest level to maintain without much expenditure on infrastructure;

- This option can continue to be implemented within current donor participation.

- It does not lower the incidence of mine deaths due to lack of initial stabilization and safe evacuation to medical treatment facilities although the mine awareness portion will help reduce the incidence of accidents;

- It will not enable OSIL-S to gain effective long-term control over mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan; and

- It tends to reinforce UNDHA's mistaken opinion that not much can be done until a peace or cease-fire is secured.

- It permits personal control to be exercised by the Executive Director OSIL-S over all aspects of the mine action and victim assistance programme as it develops;

- It does not create any degree of urgency for expanded donor participation nor for political acceptance of OSIL-S by all factions in southern Sudan as the sole coordinator of mine action and victim assistance throughout the New Sudan;

- It does not have an end-state objective towards which to aim its growth and development, thereby reducing its cost-efficiency; and

- It does not justify infrastructure expenditures to assist the growth and development of the mine action and victim assistance programme, thereby possibly resulting in a ceiling on expansion.

- It enables a maximum reduction in deaths due to a lack of capacity and/or coordination in the initial stabilization and evacuation of casualties to medical treatment facilities;

- It creates a self-sustaining capacity in the New Sudan for all facets of mine action, victim assistance, and rehabilitation;

- It creates one focal point (OSIL-S) for the coordination on behalf of the GNS of all expatriate and local NGOs working in mine action, victim assistance, and rehabilitation, including OLS-sponsored operations;

- It is capable of establishing and invigilating a territory-wide common set of standards for the selection, training, and employment of southern Sudanese deminers, including salaries and working conditions;

- It is capable of ensuring that all deminers trained in the New Sudan under humanitarian NGOs work only in humanitarian mine action; and

- It permits maximum visibility and accountability for the use of donated funds for demining, whether these be directly to the NGOs or through the Board of OSIL-S, thereby ensuring fiscal responsibility and probity and ensuring full donor confidence in this Sudanese organization;

- It can incorporate fully the second option while it builds to its steady-state capacity, with donor funding being the only limitation on its development;

- It provides the best means of coordinating ancillary operations such as victim rehabilitation and community psychological adjustment; and

- It provides the best training environment for managerial personnel appointed from the Sudanese community by its capacity for providing hands-on experience to Sudanese understudies at all levels of the MAC.

- It is the most difficult of the three organizations to control by one person (Executive Director OSIL-S), although of the three options it provides for the most positive control;

- It is the most expensive option to establish because of the infrastructure requirements, although it provides for a controlled expansion and gives the best value-for-money;

- It requires time to mature, with five years being the minimum foreseen at the present time and assuming expanded donor participation;

- It is the most vulnerable option to a reversal of fortunes by the SPLA in the internal war; and

8.1 Since the cost for Option #3 is the highest, yet returns the greatest value-for-money in the long term, the following Table for Option #3 represents what are termed in Canada "Class D" cost estimates (costs which are based upon a comprehensive requirement in mission terms and an outline of a solution, sometimes referred to as "rough order of magnitude" costs. Such an estimate is strictly an indication in round terms of the total project cost on completion date, in this case divided into years over the five year project duration). Although the costs shown are for CAMEO, the Project Authority is OSIL-S, and the vast majority of expenditures for other than CAMEO expatriate personnel will be committed under a joint signature system (Executive Director OSIL-S and Project Director CAMEO). TABLE 1

Object	Description	First Yr	Yrs 2-5 ea	TOTAL-5yrs
Personnel⁽¹⁰⁾	Expat salaries	180,000	280,000	1,300,000
	Expat allowances	60,000	120,000	660,000
	Local wages⁽¹¹⁾	20,000	60,000	260,000
	Local allowances	10,000	30,000	130,000
	Expat travel	20,000	35,000	160,000
	Local travel	8,000	15,000	68,000

Vehicles	Project vehicles⁽¹²⁾	190,000	80,000	510,000
	Running costs	40,000	50,000	240,000
	Maintenance	25,000	30,000	145,000
	HF communications	25,000	5,000	45,000

Equipment	Demining⁽¹³⁾	45,000	35,000	185,000
	VHF comms	9,000	3,000	21,000
	Survey & marking⁽¹⁴⁾	19,000	6,000	43,000
	Mine awareness⁽¹⁵⁾	30,000	22,000	118,000
	Medical⁽¹⁶⁾	55,000	30,000	175,000
	Field camp stores⁽¹⁷⁾	20,000	12,000	68,000
	Base offices⁽¹⁸⁾	22,000	4,000	38,000

Misc	Insurance	30,000	24,000	126,000
	Accommodation⁽¹⁹⁾	80,000	80,000	400,000
	Public health⁽²⁰⁾	14,000	10,000	54,000

SUB-TOTALS		902,000	901,000	4,506,000
Contingency	Incl variances	90,200	90,100	450,600

TOTALS		992,200	991,100	4,956,600

8.2 Risk is a relative term linking the desired outcome, or programming, of one of the investments with the expected results of the venture. Because this programme will take place in an uncertain environment, there can be expected to be a deviation from that which is programmed to that which is achieved, and risk management becomes the key to obtaining the desired results from the investment. For example, with the civil war continuing, the risk of having demined areas remined exists, but this risk can be reduced to a minimum by demining only those areas which have been free of conflict for a sufficient period of time that they can be deemed stable. Another example of risk is the ability of the host country's personnel to absorb and reflect the training given in various subjects because of a wide variety of backgrounds and capabilities, the solution for which would be to extend the timeframe of training. The following table summarizes the key risks and the risk management options. TABLE 2

Risk Sector	Description of Risk	Degree of risk	Risk Management Options
Technical	Avail skills in Cda Skills transfer Available equipment Technology transfer	Low Medium Low Medium	None required May extend training Import agreement Extend timeframe
Managerial	Avail Cdn skills Skills transfer to Sudan management Project mgt in Sudan	Low High Medium	Advanced notice Manager remains until successful transfer Learn from NGOs there
Gender	Skilled women personnel available in Canada Skills transfer to Sudanese women	Low, except in demining Medium	Special search for female former military engineers Cultural history to be overcome
Financial	Management by NGOs Management by Sudanese Over/under budget Inflation Donations past first yr	Low Medium Low/Med Low Medium	None required NSCC/NGO coordinator Adjust contingency Use hard currency Progress reports
Environment	Adverse impact Climate (El Niño)	Low Low/Med	None required Long-range forecasts
Logistics	Import/export delay Theft of stores/eqpt Food and water Medical supplies Transportation	Medium High High High Medium	MoU with Kenya/GNS Secure storage Self-containment Import all needs Extend lead time
Security	On-job safety Personal security Medical security	High Medium High	Strict discipline Take precautions Detailed procedures
Political	Possible power shifts Donor community	High Low	Strict neutrality Humanitarian approach
Social	Wage imbalance with other Sudanese trades	Medium	Accent hazardous occupation and duty
Cultural	Canada/Sudan difference	Medium	Prepare Canadian pers

8.2.1 Although there is considerable risk in any mine clearance endeavour in a war-beset society, in the New Sudan the risks are well known by OSIL-S who have begun operating there already. Barring unforeseen developments, all the risks associated with conducting mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan are quantifiable, and therefore manageable. Donors are requested to fund the upset limits of the project as outlined in the cost summary to ensure a successful programme without constant fear of failure at the margins. The time needed to ensure appropriate skills transfer within a community-based demining mode so that

the Sudanese can sustain the resulting Mine Action Centre with only nominal expatriate advice is approximately five years. The extent of the conflict and

the internal political situation in the New Sudan itself will determine whether this five-year objective can be achieved; however, humanitarian mine action and victim assistance is so vital to the health of the southern Sudanese that should slow-downs occur, the length of the programme should be extended accordingly to accommodate these disruptions.

- There is a broad base of support for OSIL-S in its mission to coordinate and control all aspects of mine action and victim assistance in the New Sudan, ranging from the de facto government formed by SPLM through supporting NGOs such as NSCC and DCA and UNICEF/OLS to the international donor community;

- There is an absolute requirement for a formal infrastructure to be added to OSIL-S to enable it to become self-sustaining and not be solely reliant upon the extraordinary talents of only a few individuals;

9.1.1 Managing the first year of this initial five-year programme will be of necessity an operation more geared to reacting to immediate and essential requirements than to a coordinated overall approach to bringing this acute and complicated problem under control. The OSIL-S Pilot Project Proposal forms the basis of the first year estimate shown in Table 1, with the extra requirements being those for CAMEO's assistance to OSIL-S. This first year forms the basis for a five-year programme, which is required to convert OSIL-S' current organization into a MAC configuration and to ensure effective coordination and

control as the programme expands to include mine verification databasing and victim assistance and rehabilitation services. This growth must move at a pace which can be absorbed by OSIL-S' Board of Directors and management, because the only lasting solution to this problem will be a "made in Sudan" one.

9.1.2 Managing subsequent years will see OSIL-S expanding not only its working teams but also its management capacity with the Executive Director's having trained subordinate managers ("middle management") to relieve him of the necessity of having to make all decisions beyond Team level, and adding a staff component for administration and logistics, including finance. The pace of these

changes will again be dictated by the recruitment and training of these subordinate managers, who will at their level be advised by an expatriate component under the overall direction of the Executive Director. CAMEO's Project Director will act as the staff advisor to the Executive Director, and should be the Executive Director's co-authority in the commitment of donor funds as provided for in OSIL-S' Pilot Project Proposal since both will have the same overall perspective of the organization. The audit trail would then work through NSCC to the Board of Directors of OSIL-S to ensure fiscal responsibility and probity in the management of the budget. The timing of the addition of functions beyond the planned for mine action and victim assistance, such as rehabilitation, would be the Board's prerogative.

9.2.1 Programme design and development should be accomplished through a Committee composed of members of OSIL-S' Board of Directors, the Executive Director and his key expatriate advisors, and representatives of the donor community. The Chair of this Committee should be the Chairman of the Board of Directors or an alternate Board Member if the Chairman can not be present. Resolutions passed by this Committee could then be expected to be supported by the appropriate donations required to put them into place, and activities planning can be done within a medium of certainty of implementation. Semi-annual donor update meetings could be held with all donor countries and agencies to allow them to track the progress of their investment. Such "transparent" accounting for the use of donor funds could be the key to obtaining substantial support from secular governments in addition to the already committed Church organizations who identify more instinctively with OSIL-S' mission in the New Sudan.

9.2.2 An expatriate assistance matrix of NGOs and other agencies supplying advisory personnel to OSIL-S should be created to clarify and coordinate all the many forms of assistance to be utilized by OSIL-S in the carrying out of its mandate, particularly on the mine awareness and victim assistance portion of the mission. There are many expatriate and indigenous NGOs supplying medical, social, and other services within Equatoria, where OSIL-S' mandate will initially be exercised, and to avoid duplication and overlap, each one of these assistance agencies should be recognized for their mission work to date and asked to fit the OSIL-S requirements into their responsibilities for their target populations as much as they possibly can. To do this, OSIL-S will have to finalize its areas of interest for the first year of its operation and to plan its gradual increase in the scope of its operations around the capacities already existing in the OLS/NGO community. In its follow-on mission to OSIL-S as soon as the funding can be put in place, CAMEO will assist the Executive Director OSIL-S in the formulation of this mission analysis, but it is recommended that in the meantime the OSIL-S Board of Directors start gathering this information from the OLS/NGO community on the Executive Director's behalf.

9.2.3 Creating the New Sudan Mine Action Centre is a natural follow-on from the matrix management being recommended to OSIL-S to avoid duplication and overlap in its programming. The MSMAC is a self-sustaining form of organization to ensure that all parts of the mine action and victim assistance programme for the New Sudan can be effectively coordinated within one overall mission statement and

one Mine Action Plan for the New Sudan. In effect, should OSIL-S adopt this form of organization, it is recommended that they become known as the NSMAC because

of its air of permanence for the region and its inherent visibility as a supra-NGO coordinating authority for humanitarian mine action and victim assistance on behalf of the Government of the New Sudan. It is most sincerely hoped that the United Nations will recognize this MAC as being similar to the MAC they would have formed themselves should they have decided to do so, and enable the NSMAC

to utilize funds from the UN Mine Action Voluntary Trust Fund for the vital and urgent humanitarian mine action work in the New Sudan. By so doing, the UN would become actively involved in quality assurance and thereby increase donor confidence in the effective and efficient utilization of these trust funds by the NSMAC.

2. . Report of the UN's Special Rapporteur on Sudan, Gaspar Biro, to the 52nd Session of the UN General Assembly, December 1997.

3. . The UNDHA Assessment Mission Report of August 1997 on the landmine situation in Sudan grievously erred in this humanitarian aspect when it concluded that it was "...premature to establish a MAC at this stage of the Sudanese conflict...". Only three years prior to this Report, in Angola where the war was continuing in July 1994, the UN's Central Mine Action Office was established to begin a coordinated effort at humanitarian land mine action and victim assistance.

4. . "The Landmine Situation in Sudan Assessment Mission Report", August 1997. Published by the late Department of Humanitarian Affairs Mine Clearance and Policy Unit. Authors: David Gowdey and Stephane Vigié.

5. . "Mine Awareness and Demining in the New Sudan", prepared by Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Executive Director OSIL-S, 1 October 1997.

6. . Mine Awareness and Demining in the New Sudan is geared to the art of the possible in the New Sudan as the internal war continues unabated.

7. . OLS operations in northern Sudan are coordinated with the GOS' Humanitarian Aid Commission, which has the ultimate authority.

8. . "Mine Awareness and Demining in the New Sudan", a Pilot Project Proposal originated by OSIL-S and dated 1 October 1997, page 4.

10. . Includes Project Director co-located with OSIL-S base in Kenya and six field personnel in the New Sudan. Build-up of staff will be gradual during the first year, with proportional cost adjustments.

11. . All those personnel not covered by OSIL-S in their Pilot Project Proposal for 1998. Includes office staff and field personnel. Wage rates are comparable to those for OSIL-S personnel.

12. . Costs include purchase, duties and taxes, delivery to Kenya, and initial kitting (HF wiring harness, stretcher adapters, etc.). Vehicles for the first year include three 4x4 station wagons c/w fuel monotrailer and one 5-ton stores vehicle fitted with a mobile workshop kit. Subsequent years will require one 4x4 with fuel monotrailer and one 5-ton stores vehicle for each platoon of 30 trained deminers upon graduation.

13. . Includes mine detectors, deminers tool kits, and protective clothing. Part of these costs are repeated with each serial of deminers trained, because they take their demining equipment with them upon graduation.

16. . Trauma kits for OSIL-S and community health workers, first aid supplies, pharmaceuticals, and paramedical supplies.

17. . These stores need replacing after every training serial graduates because each graduating platoon is dispatched self-sufficient in camp account items. Items include tukuls, tents, cooking equipment, etc.

19. . Includes office accommodation in Nairobi and Yei, and housing for personnel in Nairobi and Yei - rent, generators, water, waste, etc.

Sudan Projects